Friends Committee on Legislation Education Fund
Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders:
Why Do They Have Such Poor Outcomes?
Some people who are concerned about healthy development of young people have
been attracted to the idea that juveniles with behavior problems can overcome their difficulties by experiencing
military-style discipline for several months or a year. But in practice, these programs have generally failed to deliver the expected improvements in social and personal performance.
The theory behind many boot camps is that if you scream enough at children and discipline them, they will "get in line." Angry, defiant, oppositional teenagers may fall in line while in the intensely overwhelming, military-like environment of a boot camp, but in most cases these short-term "scream camps" do not create lasting changes in troubled teens
MORE...
Can a tough, demanding, high-energy
program similar to the boot-camps that train young men for military service help divert
juveniles from a life of crime? Or are the confrontational aspects of military-style training
more likely to confirm and reinforce delinquent behavior patterns?
A recent study by the
National Institute for Justice (1997) (Charts &Tables)
indicates that while a few juveniles seem to have
benefited from the boot-camp experience, most did not. Recidivism rates for those who
completed boot camps were the same as for comparable offenders who were confined in traditional institutions for lengthy periods of time.
The study also noted the high percentage of minority youth (as many as 80 percent)
among those who are confined in boot camps. This can be attributed to the fact that boot
camps typically serve urban areas with a high percentage of minority youth. Often,
however, the boot camp model fails to "connect" with this population.
The NIJ researchers are concerned that the confrontational model is full of potentially abusive situations and is antithetical to
the development of the kind of healthy, productive relationship with an adult that a youth
needs to develop maturity. The suitability of boot camps for introducing therapeutic
intervention was questioned, and it was also pointed out that the confrontational model is
difficult, if not impossible, to monitor.
The report is pessimistic about the possibility that boot-camps can be cost-effective.
A small boot camp (e.g., one with 50 beds) is not likely to produce a discernible reduction
in the population of a large correctional system. However, OJJDP's Comprehensive
Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders (Wilson and Howell, 1993)
reports that large, congregate-care juvenile facilities have not proved to be particularly
effective in rehabilitating juvenile offenders. Small, community-based facilities, on the
other hand, have proved to be effective, both as an intervention with the juvenile offender
and also in terms of cost to the provider.
Delinquents change their behavior when services are based on strengths and needs. If
youth are only offered what adults think they need, they will not accept assistance.
Effective services will help youth set up their own notions of what they need and then
make it possible for them to meet their needs through nondelinquent behavior. The services
developed should be based on the individual strengths of the youth.
A
1996 NIJ evaluation of juvenile boot camps had forcast these findings. It noted that
the programs struggled to find disciplinary measures and a clear-cut termination policy that
would not only have an impact on juveniles' negative behavior and attitudes, but would also
contribute to their genuine rehabilitation. To that end, Cleveland and Mobile used a setback
sanction that recycled unresponsive youths through parts of the program before their
graduation or termination.
"... All three programs reported high attrition rates for noncompliance, absenteeism,
and new arrests. No site graduated more than 50 percent of its aftercare participants, and
half of all terminations were caused by new arrests. In Denver, the first-year failure rate of
youths in aftercare reached nearly 71 percent. Mobile terminated fewer youths in aftercare
and had fewer rearrests than the other sites, most likely because they selected youths with
less serious delinquent histories than did Denver and Cleveland.
...One factor in this lackluster performance was the programs' inability to keep
graduates involved in activities. None of the aftercare programs found effective incentives
to attract regular attendance, and absenteeism was a significant problem at each site. In
Mobile, case supervision in aftercare remained the responsibility of participants' probation
officers and court-assigned case managers, making it difficult to identify youths not
attending their assigned clubs and to take effective remedial action.
...Moreover, the programs did not maintain the intensive discipline and regimentation
of the boot camp phase, the withdrawal of which was associated with the breakdown in
graduates' focus and motivation. Most military elements of the camps were abandoned,
with the exception of a few military-style courtesies and titles and leadership training
materials in Cleveland and Denver, and regular physical training in Denver. Youths who
went on to aftercare and remained in the demonstration for at least 8 months reported that
their attitudes and behavior had changed for the better in nearly every category surveyed.
These findings were based on a small sample, however, and responses may have been
biased toward socially acceptable answers.
Another
1996 study of juvenile bootcamps by NIJ reports that what appeared to be a
promising prognosis at the conclusion of boot camp disintegrated during aftercare. All
three programs were plagued by high attrition rates for noncompliance, absenteeism,
and new arrests during the aftercare period. No other indicators of progress were observed
during this phase that would help pinpoint where the problems lay. In all fairness to the
programs, aftercare was particularly affected by unexpected cuts in Federal support,
especially in Denver and Mobile, where reductions resulted in programs far less
comprehensive than originally planned. The programs expressed considerable concern
about making aftercare services more effective and were still seeking expert advice and
adjusting this component when the evaluation came to a close. However, at this juncture it
does not appear that the demonstration programs solved the problem that typically plagues
residential correctional programs: inmates who appear to thrive in the institutional
environment but falter when they return home.
These findings were forshadowed by a
1995 study by California's Little Hoover Commission, that called for state standards to guide development of such programs here. This year, the legislature authorized the State National Guard to set up a boot camp style facility to be known as the Turning Point Acadamy, at San Luis Obispo. [See, SB 1542 (Schiff).]
The
Koch Crime Institute (Kansas) Report on Juvenile Bootcamps maintains that
juvenile boot camps have been in full operation since only the early to
mid-1990s. There is not a working model for these camps to follow as far as
what does and does not work. But recidivism rates for traditional juvenile
settings are not much better than those of juvenile boot camps. The
recidivism rates for traditional correctional facilities are between 63% and 71%
-----------------------------
Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
Bill Lann Lee said
federal investigators found that:
-- Guards routinely used extreme forms of corporal punishment under the
guise of providing on-the-spot correction, resulting in serious injuries to
youths.
-- Mentally ill and disabled youths received inadequate care and services.
-- Inadequate screening allowed youths with injured legs and feet or
with serious medical conditions to be admitted into the program.
-- Younger children who had difficulty understanding boot camp commands
were being psychologically and physically harmed.
``It is our experts' opinion -- and the opinion of many of the boot
camp staff and mental health professionals with whom we spoke -- that the
paramilitary boot camp model is not only ineffective, but harmful to such
youths,'' Mr.Lee said.
Links to other news items on punitive sanctions
Boot Camp for "Zero Tolerance" Offenders
These findings suggest that close watch be kept on a proposal funded during the 2000 session to spend $9.2 million on a Turning Point
Acadamy at the National Guard's Camp San Luis Obispo. The plan is to use the facility for some youth 15-17 years of age
who have brought weapons to school. While no one
condones such offenses, many cases present circumstances where it is not appropriate to
send the youth away either to the Youth Authority, or to a military boarding school, and
the authority of juvenile courts should not be circumscribed. Experience with
confrontational "boot camp" programs in other states has been disappointing, and the California Military
Department has limited expertise in dealing with 15-17 year-olds. The plan called for spending over $55 thousand on each student.
|
